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THE CASE FOR CONTEXT: EISENHOWER POST-REVISIONISM 
AND THIRD WORLD NATIONALISM
By Seth Draine
Assessment of President Eisenhower’s foreign policy legacy by “revisionist” his-
torians beginning in the late 1970s revealed the leader’s decisive and insightful 
tactics that kept America in relative peace at the beginning of the Cold War. 
Contrary to the image of Ike as an amiable golfer, removed from the tough 
policy decisions that not only preceded and followed his presidency but existed 
during his time in office, the majority of Eisenhower scholarship agrees that 
through tactful and decisive actions, Ike “ran the show.”1
Stephen Ambrose is one such esteemed and well-versed scholar of the 
Eisenhower presidency who, having met and conversed at length with the former 
president, has produced a substantial number of publications on the subject 
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and remains the preeminent scholar on Eisenhower. Throughout his writings, 
Ambrose maintains that, for better or for worse, Eisenhower’s “impressive agility, 
quickness, and intelligence of mind” guided his own style of foreign policy.2 For 
Ambrose, guiding Eisenhower’s foreign policy was his firm belief that “nuclear 
war was unimaginable, limited conventional war unwinnable, and stalemate 
unacceptable,” while stressing the importance and readiness to fight commu-
nists “with every weapon at his disposal—just as he had fought the Nazis.”3 
Ambrose acknowledges the administration’s failures within the Third World, 
including perceiving and overreacting to communism within social reform 
movements as well as a borderline obsession with falling dominoes, however, 
Ambrose withholds judgment from these policy decisions claiming that “to 
say Eisenhower was right about this or wrong about that is to do little more 
than announce one’s own political position.”4 To this end, Ambrose questions 
the historians’ ability to remove Eisenhower from the Cold War containment 
framework of the decolonizing world due to “domestic pressures, the relentless 
engagement of Moscow and Peking” meddling in the Third World, and the 
“unrealistic expectations of Third World leaders in their requests for military 
and economic aid.”5 
Other scholars of the revisionist camp take a less-balanced yet equally 
celebratory portrait of the President. H.W. Brands defends Eisenhower’s in-
volvement in the developing world by suggesting that despite the Eisenhower 
administration’s packaging of their policies “in the wrappings of ideology, the 
product they sold reflected primarily a geopolitical interpretation of American 
strategic, military, diplomatic, and economic interests and demonstrated shrewd 
weighing of the effects on the international balance of power of the particular 
activities of specific nonaligned countries.”6 The most recent biography on the 
President by journalist Jim Newton, by far the most disappointing considering 
the wealth of declassified information available since the 1970s and 80s, offers 
2 Ambrose, Eisenhower, 11.  For a more condensed rewriting of Ambrose’s argument, see 
Eisenhower: Soldier and President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991).
3 Ibid., 111, 130.
4 Ibid., 621-622, 619.
5 Stephen Ambrose and Gunter Bischof, Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 10.
6 H.W. Brand, The Specter of Neutralism: the United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 
1947-1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 9.
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a repetition of earlier works with a glossier nostalgia for “a nation [left] freer, 
more prosperous, and more fair” after Eisenhower left office. 7 Questionable 
policy decision are legitimized and long-view consequences are acknowledged yet 
disregarded as the Iranian coup of 1953 “seemed costly” yet in the end, “Iran lay 
safely nestled within the American orbit for the balance of Eisenhower’s tenure,” 
agreeing that “for the first time in three years, Iran was quiet—and still free.”8
Despite the insightful validity that the majority of the revisionist perspec-
tive provides, much of the “post-revisionist” scholarship has asked readers to 
give more weight, when considering Eisenhower’s legacy, to the use of covert 
actions within decolonized regions and the impact it has had on the developing 
world. Following Ambrose’s intentions for a clearer picture of the Eisenhower 
administration, this historiographical essay seeks to give this crucial period in 
American and world history the context it deserves. Specifically, it will examine 
the insights historians have provided on the motivations and impact of covert 
operations, suggesting that a misreading or failed recognition of regionally 
specific contexts led the foreign policies of the Eisenhower administration 
down interventionist paths with detrimental results in the Middle East, Central 
America, and South-east Asia. Thus, context, rather than damnation from the 
safety of hindsight, is the purpose of examining Eisenhower’s use of covert 
action throughout the Third World. By complicating our understanding of 
Cold War foreign policies to include geopolitical and economic strategies, as 
well as deconstructing the Cold War and post-colonial environment in which 
such decisions were enlisted, a more complete understanding of America’s use 
and impact of covert action will arise.
Despite this historiography’s argument for context, it does not strive 
to be a fully exhaustive historiographical narrative, nor an all-inclusive ac-
counting of covert action and intervention during the Eisenhower years. For 
the purpose of brevity, only the most well received scholars on each regional 
intervention are discussed followed by a deconstructive account provided by 
historians of cultural studies to add an additional dimension to Eisenhower’s 
foreign policy decisions. Nor does this historiography include other interven-
tions and plans pursued around the world such as in the Congo, Indochina, 
Burma, Laos, Venezuela, or Cuba. What proceeds is a chronological and regional 
7 Jim Newton, Eisenhower: the White House Years (New York: Doubleday, 2011), 357.
8 Ibid., 119
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discussion of the CIA covert operations in Iran, Guatemala, and Indonesia by 
“post-revisionist” historians and authors. It seeks to dissect the motivations 
and impact of Eisenhower’s covert foreign policy decisions and the dangers of 
ignoring crucial regional contexts.
In All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle Eastern 
Terror, Stephen Kinzer’s spy novel-like coverage of the players, intricacies, and 
motives surrounding the 1953 overthrow of Iranian president-elect, Muhammad 
Musaddiq, provides a bilateral, economic context for the CIA led coup and 
the dramatic repercussions that have plagued the region since. Taking a criti-
cal stance on the orchestrating and participation in the coup, Kinzer argues 
that British oil control in the region was threatened by Musaddiq’s desire to 
nationalize the industry, propagating unfounded fears of Iran’s path toward 
communism. The result was the re-installation of Reza Shah who supported 
British and American oil interests yet continued an oppressive tyranny that 
ultimately led to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, inspiring fundamentalists 
such as the Taliban to gain strength and momentum in a post-Cold War world.
Despite Kinzer’s suspense ridden prose, his revealing narrative through 
the use of both Iranian and American sources (following on the heels of leaked 
CIA documents in 2000 to the New York Times that both confirmed and added 
to historians’ knowledge of the American led events in 1953) has contributed 
to an argument that supports the long view of history—where actions have far 
reaching and often unforeseen impacts. To develop this argument, Kinzer ad-
dresses the three parties present during the build-up to the coup—Muhammad 
Musaddiq of Iran, Winston Churchill of Britain, and from the United States, 
Dwight Eisenhower and Allen and John Dulles—and their varying desires and 
motives during the crisis. 
Kinzer sets the stage with a brief overview of Iran’s long historical dilemma 
between moral obligation and authoritarian foreign rule, beginning with the 
rise of Zoroastrianism during the sixth century B.C.E. and ending with the 
corrupt and irresponsible economic behavior of the Qajar monarchs in 1925, 
allowing British colonial rule to overwhelm the political and economic (oil) 
institutions of the region. Fast-forward twenty-four years of modernization 
attempts, Nazi sympathizers, and a British/Russian invasion to instate Reza 
Shah Pahlavi, Kinzer reveals his tragic protagonist, Mohammad Musaddiq. As 
a secular nationalist, Musaddiq was a champion of the democratic process, free 
press, and the right of Iranians to discard British colonial subjugation in the 
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political process and their primary economic industry—oil. On this secular 
nationalist platform, Musaddiq was elected as Prime Minister in 1951, and 
soon thereafter, nationalized the Anglo Iranian Oil Company.
For the second party, Britain, this development was unacceptable on two 
counts: Britain maintained the right to rule their established colonies, and that 
the oil profits from their colony sustained the British economy.9 Inciting help 
from the third party, the United States, proved to be a necessary yet difficult 
task. For former president Harry S. Truman, Cold War anxieties consumed his 
worldview and colonialism was merely a waning, outdated mode of international 
relations. After failed attempts at negotiation and reconciliation between Iran 
and British interests, what ultimately bridged this ideological gap, for Kinzer, 
were the Korean War and Soviet international communism. With the return of 
the Conservative Churchill and the election of more active containment policies 
of President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the White 
House was sold on the threat of Iran’s takeover by communists as not only 
endangering the Middle East, but British supported efforts in Korea as well.10 
If Kinzer paints the White House as being courted and persuaded by 
the British, it was the clever work of the Secretary of State John Foster and his 
brother, head of the CIA, Allen Dulles that ultimately convinced Eisenhower 
to approve the CIA-led coup of Musaddiq. By distorting the implications of 
negotiation deals between Britain and Iran concerning their oil holdings as well 
as stirring dissent among prominent ties in Iran, the Dulles brothers were able to 
make the case to remove an unreasonable and unsupported Musaddiq regime. 
After expressing his “desire not to know too much,” Eisenhower was given the 
“broad brush [strokes]” of the coup, leaving the ground work of Operation 
AJAX up to CIA officer Kermit Roosevelt who implemented the operation’s 
psychological warfare of propaganda and mob insurrection that ultimately led 
to the arrest, overthrow, and imprisonment of Musaddiq.11
As stated in the preceding paragraphs, one of the major contributions 
of Kinzer’s work to the fields of American history and foreign policy has been 
his insistence of, not merely economic and Cold War anxieties as agents of 
9 Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (New 
Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 88-91. 
10 Ibid.,130-132.
11 Ibid., 152-154, 156, 159-160.  
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intervention within the Third World, but allied pressure and manipulation 
of these factors toward unscrupulous ends. Furthermore, Kinzer’s extensive 
historical accounts of both British era colonialism and pre-modern roots of 
foreign distrust and contempt offer a more complete understanding of regional 
problems and priorities. However, such a macro-approach does have its pit-
falls. Just as Kinzer takes the long view of historical impact leading up to the 
election of Musaddiq, his conclusion that the events that followed the coup’s 
reinstating of Reza Shah Pahlavi’s oppressive regime led to the overwhelming 
distrust and anger toward the United States and the West creates a simplified 
picture of the Middle East. Certainly Reza Shah’s oppression and imprison-
ment of religious leaders and political adversaries contributed to the Islamic 
Revolution and terrorist fringe that spiraled from it. However, overall distaste 
for the West must include other factors such as the Suez Crisis just three years 
later, Kennedy’s land and liberal reforms imposed on the Shah, and Johnson’s 
and Nixon’s support of Israel.12 Kinzer’s contribution to our remembering of 
the 1953 CIA-led coup is invaluable, riveting, and illuminating, however, by 
presuming such a clear line of causation, he simplifies the very region that he 
works so diligently to complicate.
Just as Kinzer works to expand our understanding of the Iranian coup by 
concentrating on the persuasive arguments made by European allies and within 
the White House, John Foran’s “Discursive Subversions: Time Magazine, the 
CIA Overthrow of Musaddiq, and the Installation of the Shah” complicates 
the policy decision further through a deconstruction of U.S. domestic influ-
ences. By examining popular cultural discourse in America during the 1940s 
and 1950s, Foran sheds light on the influences of Orientalism within the press 
and its great impact on American foreign policy in Iran and the subsequent 
CIA-led coup in 1953. For Foran, along with the Cold War context of the 
political economy of oil and geostrategic power within the Middle East, the 
1953 coup was a product of a battle over discursive hegemony between the 
Orientalist discourse of American and Iranian actors, specifically Musaddiq. 
Ultimately, it was Time Magazine’s condemnation of the tumultuous region 
12 Masoud Kazemzadeh, “All the Shah’s Men book review,” Middle East Policy 11, 4 (Winter 
2004): 122.25
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during Truman’s presidency that helped bring about an administration more 
willing to intervene in Iran’s internal affairs.13
Due to his source emphasis on popular press, Foran first seeks to articulate 
his “thick descriptive” theoretical dimensions by defining and explaining cultural 
studies in the context of Marxist literary criticism and subaltern studies to create 
what he defines as “third world cultural studies.”14 Within these general and 
fluctuating boundaries of his version of cultural studies, Foran contends that 
the press, most notably Time magazine, “framed” public and elite discussion 
through its ability to create a general popular mood, provide a check on policy 
elites, and to give or withhold legitimacy from dissenting views. In turn, these 
“frames” of constructed social realities, reflected long-standing Orientalist images 
and stereotypes of Easterners as inferior, childish, and feminine.15 
To understand how Time influenced American foreign policy, Foran 
argues that from its inception, the magazine was a key shaper of American po-
litical culture and through its devotion to Republican, pro-business lines, and 
commitment to bringing the “serious issues of world politics” to an educated 
American audience, by the 1940s and 50s Time (and its subsidiary Life) had 
become the most influential shaper of public opinion in America.16 To demon-
strate this assertion, Foran reveals not only the fluctuating attention by Time 
to the events in Iran and the change in U.S. administration, but the language 
used to report on it throughout each stage of the international development. 
In this instance, although all politics in Iran were covered as corrupt in the 
U.S., the treatment of Reza Shah and Musaddiq differed significantly. While 
the Shah maintained both Middle Eastern stereotypes of youthful ignorance 
and Western sensibilities of class and educated business interests, Musaddiq 
is at first briefly depicted as honest, of Western education, and devoted to 
13 John Foran, “Discursive Subversions: Time Magazine, the CIA Overthrow of Musaddiq, 
and the Installation of the Shah” in Cold War Constructions: the Political Culture of the United 
States Imperialism, 1945-1966, ed. Christian G. Appy (Amherst: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 2000), 182.
14 Clifford Geertz’ use of “thick description” was intended to understand human behavior and 
language by deconstructing their historical, social, and cultural contexts.  Marxist literary criticism 
benefits from Geertz’ work by referring to “texts” as reflections of their historical and social surround-
ings, thus revealing the silent language of class consciousness hidden beneath the text.  Subaltern 
studies works to reveal the agency of actors outside of a world-systems hegemonic power structure.
15 Foran, 161-162.
16 Ibid., 165.
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democracy and anti-Soviet communism, but then quickly turns into a weak 
man of childish fanatical tantrums.17 
By the time of the 1952 election, much of Time and Life magazine had 
been devoted to criticizing the Truman administration’s weak stance on con-
tainment and supported the installation of “strong men” in order to insure 
stability and “order” in regions of interest.18 With Eisenhower’s election (Henry 
Luce, editor-in-chief of Time and Life, often bragged that his editorial work 
had elected Ike into office), Time and Life publications were at the forefront 
of positing communist “domino theories” with Iran, not Vietnam, at the top. 
Both publications heavily supported the removal of Musaddiq under these 
presumptions. However, for Foran, this fear was a view held at the top, not 
by lower-level Iranian specialists within the State Department, who arguably 
had more contextual knowledge of the region and its underlining nationalist 
prerogatives. Thus, the influence of the press in sustaining a Cold War view 
of the world helped legitimize the necessity of a coup and in the aftermath of 
political trials of Musaddiq, the benefits of a redefined “older,” “wiser”, yet a 
rejuvenated and “firm” Shah.19 
Foran qualifies his theoretical approach by admitting the absence of a 
clear line of causality between Orientalist discourse and foreign policy deci-
sions. However, this does not make these mindsets irrelevant, as they serve as 
contextual realities that reveal themselves in the language used by policy officials, 
perpetuating and applying ideas of weakness versus strength, masculinity versus 
femininity, and aptitude versus child-like ignorance. Therefore, a deconstruction 
of why and how ideological frameworks are created and sustained is crucial 
for understanding the decision making process of top foreign policy leaders. 
In his well received analysis, The CIA in Guatemala, Richard Immerman 
argues that though protection of United Fruit (UFCO) business interests in 
Guatemala was paramount, a basic misunderstanding of Guatemalan people 
and history by the U.S. government and public resulted in the ensuing coup and 
conflict between the two nations. Rather than “merely another instance of big 
stick diplomacy,” American covert action in Guatemala illustrates McCarthy-
era, Cold War ethos of economic and ideological security abroad from a Soviet 
17 Ibid., 169-171.
18 Ibid., 174.
19  Ibid., 179.
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international-conspiracy. The result was a skewing of regional revolutions where 
the line between nationalism and communist subversion was narrowed to a 
point where threats to U.S. interests became the only discernible difference. 
To thwart communist subversion, the Eisenhower administration pushed for 
the use of decisive and preventative covert measures as opposed to costly and 
thinly spread containment policies. 
The argument for context begins with an understanding of the 1944 
Guatemalan Revolution and the nationalist desire to overthrow a legacy of 
exploitation and underdevelopment by foreign rule in Guatemala. Immerman 
traces back racial divisions and land consolidation to sixteenth-century Spanish 
rule, however, the dichotomy between imperial growth at the cost of Guatemalan 
underdevelopment explodes with the liberal era of industrialization, foreign 
investment, and public services beginning in the late nineteenth century. 20 
Specifically, Guatemala’s growing dependence on U.S. business investment, most 
notably but not solely United Fruit, resulted in the skewing of land ownership, 
exploitation of indigenous labor, reliance on an export based resource economy 
for revenues and imports to sustain population needs, and political leaders that 
accommodated such foreign investments at the cost of the Guatemalan people. 
In October of 1944, such disparities within the nation were taken to the streets 
and with it the overthrow of the oppressive regime of Jorge Ubico Casteneda. 
In his place emerged the revolution’s first elected president, Juan Jose Arevalo, 
under promises of land and labor reform as well as social programs that would 
become the cornerstone of the new Guatemalan government.21 
From the October Revolution in 1944 to the election of Jacobo Arbenz 
in 1950, Immerman contends that U.S. lack of preparedness (Ambassador 
Boaz Long admitted to the State Department that the overthrow of Ubico 
was “the farthest thing from my thoughts”) and understanding of the causes 
behind the decade’s revolutionary and nationalizing events was due to a state of 
denial about the capabilities of the “children” of Guatemala.22 Therefore, when 
Guatemalans voiced dissent of “Yankee imperialism”—signified by United 
Fruit-led government corruption, tax evasion, racist policies, and indifference 
20 Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: the Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1982), 22.
21 Ibid., 48.
22 Ibid., 85.
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to public welfare and wages—materialized in the revolutionary government’s 
capitalist modernization plans for infrastructure development and agrarian 
reform, UFCO lobbyists cried foul. What followed was a suspicious eye on 
the labor reform policies under Arevalo, and a heightened sense of anxiety over 
the election of Arbenz with his promise to continue Arevalo’s social reforms as 
well as initiate agrarian reforms. Such agrarian reforms sought to expropriate, 
with compensation, land left idle by 2.2 percent of the population (which, by 
1950, claimed 70 percent of Guatemalan land) to the rest of the Guatemalan 
people, thereby diversifying Guatemala’s export-based economy and reduc-
ing their dependency on imports.23 Arbenz’ measure was soundly rejected by 
UFCO which voiced its fear of a loss of stability to policy makers within the 
United States government.
However, as opposed to what authors Schlesinger and Kinzer have writ-
ten on the influence of United Fruit lobbyists and the revolving door between 
the company and U.S. political office, Immerman maintains that even without 
such business influences and pressures, a government led removal of Arbenz 
was imminent simply within the Cold War beliefs of communist international 
threats.24 For Immerman, a misunderstanding by U.S. policy makers of the 
intentions of Guatemalan reforms coupled with the broad definition of com-
munism developed within the polar world of Cold War ethos brought about the 
perceived need for intervention. By the time the more active anti-communist 
foreign policy of Dwight Eisenhower (in comparison to Truman) was elected 
into office and John Foster Dulles was appointed as his Secretary of State, much 
of Washington was in agreement that communism could be defined as simply 
“opposing United States interests” and that identifying such elements could 
be concluded through a “duck test” where the accused were guilty by merely 
walking or talking like a communist.25 
Immerman relies on the wealth of behind-the-scenes insights revealed 
through the Eisenhower Diaries, NSC documents, and “Whitman file” tran-
scripts between the President and Dulles to reveal the hard-line, anti-communist 
beliefs that guided the President and Secretary of State in opposition to what 
23 Ibid., 65.
24 For an argument blaming the infiltration of business into U.S. politics resulting in the 
Guatemalan coup see Stephen Kinzer and Stephen Schlesinger, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American 
Coup in Guatemala (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982); Immerman, 123-124. 
25 Immerman, 105 
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they believed were the failed containment measures of the Truman administra-
tion in China and Korea. In light of these documents, Immerman contends 
that ignorance and a general lack of information and evidence did not stop the 
administration from green lighting project PBSUCCESS, the covert operation 
to overthrow Arbenz, into action. Repeatedly, “tenuous and indirect” evidence 
as well as intelligence that showed “nothing conclusive” for an international 
communist conspiracy left Dulles continually frustrated in his attempt to find 
a connection.26 This lack of direct communist evidence to support covert inter-
vention strengthens Immerman’s argument for a nationalist revolution unable 
to be translated into the absolutist language of Cold War polarity. 
Christian Appy expands on the argument for a lack of evidence and 
understanding of the Guatemalan people used to justify military intervention 
into Guatemalan politics. However, in his article “Eisenhower’s Guatemalan 
Doodle, or: How to Draw, Deny, and Take Credit for a Third World Coup,” 
Appy concentrates on Eisenhower’s personality, a product of his competitive 
spirit as well as societal trends of Cold War urgency and polarity to make his 
unique argument. For Appy, the means by which the Eisenhower administration 
both denied involvement as well as took credit for the 1954 Guatemalan coup 
is emblematic of the mentalité that drove the administration to intervene in the 
first place. Just as policy makers created a shaky, yet unchallenged narrative to 
comment on their Latin American success, so too did Eisenhower and Dulles 
“file the edges” of Guatemalan communist evidence to make their actions fit 
their predetermined national security priorities. Appy argues that this is partially 
indicative of Eisenhower’s competitive, score-keeping spirit, where the odds 
for success (cited in classified papers as merely twenty percent) were pitted 
against images and assumption of “Amero-centric” “superpower arrogance” 
that shaped much of Cold War policy. Thus, as Appy writes: “Once Eisenhower 
had concluded that Guatemala had fallen within the ‘Soviet orbit,’ that satel-
lite’s internal life and history was, by definition, rendered largely irrelevant.” 27
Though much of Appy’s argument is informed by the work of highly 
26 Ibid., 185.
27  Christian Appy, “Eisenhower’s Guatemalan Doodle, or: How to Draw, Deny, and Take 
Credit for a Third World Coup” in Cold War Constructions: the Political Culture of the United States 
Imperialism, 1945-1966, edited by Christian G. Appy (Amherst: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 2000), 190.
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regarded scholars on the subject, his original vantage point is guided by the 
many personal letters and diary entrees available through the Eisenhower Library. 
The most interesting, and unique, source used sets the tone and trajectory of 
Appy’s deconstruction: a sketch drawn by Eisenhower the day after the coup on 
a morning meeting agenda outline (for an image of the “Eisenhower doodle” 
see Figure 1).28 From the roughly sketched images of a bare-chested Anglo (pre-
sumably a self portrait), gun boat and non-military vessels, as well as “Internal 
security” and “Guatemala” written twice, underlined, and traced repeatedly, 
Appy attempts to deconstruct the images as representative of the assumptions 
and themes that shaped U.S. Cold War foreign policy. For Appy, these im-
ages shed light on how “Eisenhower envisioned the world he so profoundly 
affected”—a faceless world, void of the individual Guatemalans he sought to 
redirect, in need of Anglo strength and security. Thus, despite Eisenhower’s self-
publicized support of the non-existent “Guatemalan counterrevolutionaries” 
and “people-to-people” exchanges, “he left no evidence of any serious interest 
in the people of Guatemala.”29
Those readers who have little patience for cultural abstractions and de-
constructions will be pleased that Eisenhower’s doodle does not serve as a 
“smoking gun” or central primary source for any argument of subconscious 
motives or actions. Rather, through the use of personal letters by Eisenhower, 
Appy extracts a common theme of competition, from the golf course to the 
bridge table, which can be seen in his secret organizing and public explanation 
of the 1954 coup. 30 From laughing at Secretary of State Dulles’ and assistant 
Henry Holland’s warning of the twenty percent chance for a successful coup 
of Arbenz as well as its legality under international agreements, to his preoc-
cupation with golf games leading up to and during the time of the coup and 
his desires to take credit for what was projected as another notch within the 
anti-communist struggle, Appy raises important questions concerning the level 
of interest Eisenhower had for the actual people of Guatemala—that Eisenhower 
was at once intricately involved yet emotionally removed from the coup itself.
28 Appy’s work is informed by prominent scholars on the subject including Stephen Schlesinger 
and Stephen Kinzer, Richard Immerman, Piero Gleijese, Jim Handy, Blanche Wiesen Cook, and 
Nick Cullather.
29Appy, 186.
30 Ibid., 197-198.
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Along with the actual planning of the coup, media propaganda within 
Guatemala as well as the United States played a key role in its success. At 
once, the administration faced the difficult task of denying U.S. involvement, 
presenting Guatemala as a dangerous “communist beachhead,” and revealing 
a popular Guatemalan resistance that did not exist, while taking credit for 
the covert operation.31 To achieve this ambitious goal, Appy suggests that the 
threat of communism within Guatemala was relentlessly presented as a real 
and dangerous international threat while descriptions of the actual “popular 
revolt” were left vague and inconclusive. Any challenges to the legitimacy of 
the revolt were not only dismissed as a “communist lie” but “regarded as a ret-
roactive justification for the very operation they were disavowing.”32 Thus, the 
vilification of the Arbenz government and the subsequent dismissal of foul play 
31 Ibid., 205.
32 Ibid., 209
Fig. 1: “Eisenhower Doodle.”
(Photocopy from Christian Appy, Cold 
War Constructions: the Political Culture 
of the United States Imperialism, 
1945-1966. Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2000, 184.
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closely paralleled the domestic fear mongering campaigns of McCarthyism. In 
the end, through a complacent press and presidential memoirs and speeches, 
both Eisenhower and Dulles were able at once to affirm Guatemalan popular 
support for the counterrevolution as well as cite the event as a victory for U.S. 
desires to thwart the communist threat throughout the world.
As with most actions, the true impact of the intervention is only revealed 
in its enduring legacy. For Immerman and Appy, the impact of the Guatemalan 
coup was indeed far reaching. Primarily, the 1954 coup reinstated the life 
Guatemalan’s had fought to diminish. Castillo Armas, the first in a long line of 
U.S.-supported presidents after the coup, not only reversed the land and labor 
reforms to support United Fruit once again, but installed an oppressive regime 
that fell hard on dissent through “Gestapo-like tactics” resulting in a fifty year 
cycle of repression and killing of over 200,000 lives.33 Beyond the persecution 
of the Guatemalans themselves, both Immerman and Appy make a compelling 
argument that the perceived success of the 1954 coup led to misguided conclu-
sions that were applied to subsequent interventions. Just as the Iranian coup 
a year earlier provided a framework for the events in Guatemala, the blanket 
model of combining military threats, covert operations, and indigenous alliances 
are argued to have been directly applied to the soon to follow intervention in 
Indonesia and the Bay of Pigs invasion the following decade. 
Both Immerman’s and Appy’s discussions of Cold War policy through 
preemptive action in Guatemala complicates our understanding of the motiva-
tions and assumptions behind Cold War covert actions. Although in one sense 
Immerman’s and Appy’s work testifies to the incredibly blurred and uncertain 
world in which foreign policy leaders worked, it also speaks to this paper’s theme 
of selective ignorance of regional historical directions and the extent to which 
the Eisenhower administration was willing to ensure economic, political, and 
ideological security in Latin America. Thus, during a time when the actions of 
individual actors became increasingly more powerful, and the implications of 
such decisions more detrimental, an examination of personalities and viewpoints 
has the potential to reveal additional context to motivations and reasoning of 
Cold War policies.
During the beginning years of the Cold War, little room was left for 
neutrality as Soviet/American bipolarity effectively mapped out and kept a 
33 Immerman, 199;  Appy, 196.
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running score of regional ideological and political affiliation. For the Eisenhower 
administration, the Sukarno government in Indonesia fit this mold of dangerous 
neutrality and, running on the momentum of perceived successful subversive 
action in Iran, Guatemala, and the Congo, opted for another round in CIA- led 
covert political disruption. In Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower 
and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia, Audrey and George Kahin argue that the co-
vert operations used to provoke and abet a major revolution and civil war in 
Indonesia during the late 1950s is attributed not only to “presidential prejudice” 
of popular elected leaders, but a reliance on poor intelligence gathering by the 
CIA and the political naïveté that followed. With a wealth of over 45 years of 
research including both CIA and Indonesian documents as well as firsthand 
accounts and interviews conducted by George Kahin in Indonesia during the 
1940s revolution, the Kahins’ critical yet sophisticated assessment of the failed 
1959 coup warn of the dangers in using past and ultimately detrimental CIA led 
actions as guidelines when applied to complex and varying regional contexts.
To give context to American involvement in the region and Indonesia’s 
non-alignment decision, the Kahins describe America’s favorable yet at times 
contradictory role in the 1949 Revolution. Though America had supported the 
popular revolution against Dutch colonial control, after the successful declara-
tion of the independent Indonesian state the U.S. refrained from holding the 
Dutch accountable in the United Nations to relinquish its control over the 
culturally significant region of West Irian (New Guinea). The Kahins maintain 
that although the Dutch were probably correct in their desire to withhold the 
small portion of the island to appease the nationalism of chauvinistic elements 
in Holland needed to pass the decolonization agreement through Parliament, 
the Indonesians saw the act as an illegitimate retention of culturally significant 
land. 34 Ultimately for the Kahins, the support of the United States behind the 
Dutch West Irian issue as well as unscrupulous, U.S.-mediated debt negotia-
tions that favored the Dutch made Indonesian alignment with the U.S. a less 
than favorable resolution.
In an act of realism and balance, much of which has come from George 
Kahin’s residency and connections in Indonesia during the post-revolution 
34 Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower 
and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia  (New York: The New Press, 1995), 34-35.
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era, the Kahins portray the revolution’s shaky government as a less than ideal 
system, far from a popular utopia of democratic self-determination. Due to 
the region’s unfortunate history during WWII, Japanese occupation, and the 
revolution against the Dutch, much of the country’s government, infrastruc-
ture, economy, and social well being had been either dismantled or destroyed. 
With the country experiencing growing hardships and the colonial hegemonic 
educational structure severely weakened during the decade leading up to the 
revolution, much of the incoming political contenders espoused left of center 
variants of socialist, anti-foreign capital control. Within this context, Sukarno, 
Indonesia’s president from 1945 to 1967, sought a “guided democracy” to 
strengthen national unity where exploitation of weaker groups would be avoided 
through a more balanced power structure. 35 
This desire for unity sounded alarms for President Eisenhower, Secretary 
of State Dulles, and CIA operatives in Java (including brother, Allen Dulles). 
Following the Truman administration’s loss of China, criticized for allowing the 
weakening Nationalist government to maintain its territorial integrity and thus 
unity in time of crisis, the Eisenhower administration perceived the proposed 
plan for Indonesian unification as a potential threat for communist subver-
sion. Criticism and warnings by U.S. ambassador in Indonesia, John Allison, 
that the barriers which propped up non-alignment sentiment in the country 
were rooted in the debt and territorial issues surrounding the United State’s 
support of the Dutch, were ignored and ultimately led to his reassignment in 
Czechoslovakia. Based on the inaccurate conclusions of a communist “abso-
lute majority” on select islands made by the CIA (specifically John’s brother, 
Allen Dulles), despite counter evidence provided by ambassador Allison, the 
Eisenhower administration not only chose to support rebel colonels against the 
government, but discouraged compromise between the opposing sides through 
a refusal to bend on the Dutch territorial and debt issues as well as through 
encouragement and support of rebellious army colonels. Though the opposing 
sides were far from willing or prepared to engage in another war, the U.S. had 
anticipated the possibility of a civil war and was already building up support 
for the rebels during the ultimately futile negotiations. 36
35  Ibid., 53. 
36 Ibid., 95, 115-119, 143.
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37 Ibid., 190.
38 Ibid., 220. 
39 Ibid., 228.
As U.S. officials had predicted, the result was a civil war in 1958 between 
the Sukarno government and the rebels, secretly backed by American forces 
through unmarked air support and armaments. For two years leading up to 
and during the war, U.S. support continued for the rebels, yet due to an over-
estimation of popular support for rebel leaders (hurt by Indonesian awareness 
of U.S. support), an underestimation of nationalist support for Sukarno, and 
the capture of American pilot Allen Pope, the Eisenhower administration was 
forced to reassess its policy. In a move to increase flexibility, yet in hindsight 
painfully contradictory, Secretary of State Dulles and President Eisenhower 
made the decision to switch their support to the Sukarno government while 
continuing, albeit severely limited, support for the rebels. 37 In the end, U.S. 
meddling in the affairs of Indonesia had strengthened the very forces Americans 
had tried to diminish: the non-alignment of the Sukarno government, the army’s 
increased authority through martial law, as well as the now growing popularity 
of the communist PKI party due to their capitalization of outrage over U.S. 
involvement. The result was a tripolarization between these now enlarged, 
tense, and brittle fractions leaving neither an effective form of governance nor 
political stability, paving the way for a major political explosion ending in a 
failed communist coupe, an army-led counter-coup, and the beginnings of a 
singular military dictatorship under Suharto in 1965, lasting until 1998. 38 
As what is now embarrassingly clear and yet frustratingly absent during 
the time, was any consideration to dissenting views of intervention. However, 
despite these inconsistencies, an argument for a clearer vision based on the pres-
ent benefit of hindsight is perhaps too much to ask of historical actors. Rather, 
what is particularly troublesome with the case of covert action in Indonesia 
is not only the flip-flopping of U.S. support during the civil war, but more 
importantly the willingness of the Eisenhower administration to encourage 
such a steadfast, uncompromising division that would most certainly lead to a 
devastating loss of life (thousands during the Civil War and over half a million 
during the 1965-66 massacre under the military coup victor, Suharto) and 
societal cohesion. 39 Thus, as with the covert actions in Iran and Guatemala, 
despite intentions of precision and strategic action meant to ultimately save lives 
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by avoiding conventional or atomic warfare, the intervention methods chosen 
ultimately reflect a failure to gather as well as consider known intelligence of 
regional and historical circumstances, resulting in the loss of life and societal 
disruption well beyond the organizers’ predicted consequences.
This stage within the Cold War offers a glimpse of the world at the height 
of modernity: societal power and structure whittled down to two competing 
ideologies, one claiming supremacy as the bearer of history and the future, 
while the other asserting its authority as the protector of human rights and 
freedom; technological might to annihilate thousands at the push of a button; 
and the ability to overrule the natural boundaries that had once offered societ-
ies security and comfort from foreign threats. With the amazingly destructive 
power to human life, society, and nature displayed during the Second World 
War, many saw the urgency of this global crossroads and chose to act, not with 
the total might of their visible arsenal, but with the precision and quickness 
only possible under the cloak of secrecy. 
With modernity, however, the perceived ability of individuals to supersede 
and manipulate humankind and the natural world in which they reside, comes 
the responsibility to use all of the knowledge at one’s disposal. Though President 
Eisenhower was merely a single individual, surrounded by persuasive cabinet 
members and consumed by a Cold War culture of uncertainty, distrust, and 
urgency the actions he chose to pursue failed to set a precedent for appropriate 
conduct within a new and changing world. With the perception of repetitive 
triumphant operations so close in their rearview mirror, Eisenhower and his 
administration continued down an interventionist path, ignoring evidence that 
challenged what they believed had been successful manipulations of foreign 
government and society. For the Eisenhower administration, despite their ef-
forts to use far less invasive and physically damaging methods, societal scars left 
from the coups d’état had far reaching implications. By validating or glossing 
over events that had such a detrimental effect on the people, government, and 
overall well being of developing nations, historians not only risk promoting a 
repetition of such short-sighted decisions, but also threaten our global reputa-
tion as a nation that holds freedom above oppression.
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